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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of international financial integration
in a two–sector heterogeneous–agent dynamic general equilibrium model of oc-
cupational choice with financial constraints and idiosyncratic risks. We discuss
the macroeconomic and distributional effects of financial market integration for
small economies which differ only with respect to the tightness of constraints
on the domestic credit market. The results contribute to an explanation for the
‘Lucas paradox’, i.e. the empirical observation of capital flowing from poor to
rich countries, where lending countries are characterized by tighter domestic
constraints and lower capital returns. Capital market liberalization goes along
with adjustments towards the world return. Capital–exporting countries expe-
rience an increase in GNP, whereas the GDP effect is of ambiguous sign and
driven by the tightness of the domestic credit market. Countries with less tight
constraints or unlimited access to external business financing loose throughout
integration due to a decline in aggregate output and a very unequal distribution
of welfare gains and losses in the underlying heterogeneous–agent economy. We
find that international integration is only beneficial for economies where finan-
cial constraints on entrepreneurial activity are very tight. Here, we observe an
accumulation–driven rise in the entrepreneurship rate, overall positive output
effects and welfare gains for all members of society.
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1 Introduction
For the past twenty years the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have
experienced a sustained rise in their current account deficits, while many emerging
economies from East Asia, and in particular China throughout recent years, have
either drastically reduced their deficit or even built up substantial surpluses (see Fig-
ure 1). Prasad et al. (2006) find perverse patterns of capital flows in the 2000s from
poor to rich countries. The empirically observed pattern of international capital flows
contradicts standard neoclassical theory, which predicts that capital should flow from
more to less developed countries. A growing body of literature explains this empirical
evidence, conveniently dubbed as ‘Lucas paradox’ (referring to the influential work by
Lucas, 1990), with the presence of borrowing constraints in poorer countries; see e.g.
Gertler and Rogoff (1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), and Matsuyama (2004, 2005),
or more recently Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza et al. (2009), and Sandri (2009).
Our paper contributes to this strand of research. We present a two–sector neo-
classical heterogeneous–agent dynamic general equilibrium model of occupational
choice with financial constraints and idiosyncratic risks, which allows us to relate the
pattern of international capital movements to cross–country differences in financial
market imperfections. We find that countries may as well as not benefit from financial
market integration, the outcome depending on the tightness of domestic constraints
and the resulting capital return of a small economy under autarky relative to the
world real interest rate. Notably, it is the more constrained economy which claims
welfare gains for all members of society.
As well–known from the literature, countries facing tighter credit constraints have
lower domestic interest rates and generally become net–exporters of capital if capital
markets open for international borrowing and lending. In our model economy, inter-
national capital flows are only indirectly capable of mitigating adverse output effects
from financial constraints on domestic credit markets. Lending countries benefit from
financial integration in terms of a higher GNP, but it is the underlying distribution of
income and wealth which determines whether or not this translates into an overall
welfare gain. We find that lending countries with less tight constraints or unlimited
access to external business financing loose throughout integration due to a decline in
aggregate output and a very unequal distribution of welfare gains and losses in the
underlying heterogeneous–agent economy.
The model economy consists of two sectors of production: an unconstrained cor-
porate sector and a non–corporate ‘small business’ sector, where firm owners produce
intermediate goods and are subject to financial constraints. This is consistent with
previous work by Bernanke et al. (1998) suggesting that smaller firms face tighter
constraints than large firms. We assume that financial constraints in our model arise
from limited commitment of business owners and not from lack of financial interme-
diaries or under–developed financial markets. It is important to stress that financial
integration in our model neither helps to alleviate agency problems nor directly facil-
itates small firms’ access to external funding. The international capital flows of our
model explicitly originate from cross–country differences in the tightness of financial
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Figure 1: Net Foreign Asset Positions (data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007)
constraints. The latter are persistent, because the primary source of credit market
imperfection is limited commitment of borrowers. In this context, we do not think
it convincing to assume that foreign lenders and financial intermediaries are less
risk averse or more effective in monitoring and law enforcement than their domestic
counterparts.
Credit market frictions are a threefold impediment to economic activity in our
model economy: Firstly, agents are restrained from smoothing their intertemporal
consumption path by borrowing and lending. Common to Huggett (1993)–Aiyagari
(1994)–type economies, the agents then undertake buffer–stock savings to self–insure
on intertemporal markets against the non–diversifiable income risk.1 Because a busi-
ness owner’s wealth also serves as collateral for external financing, individual ac-
cumulation is important for occupational choice. Secondly, credit–constrained busi-
ness owners are not able to operate at their profit–maximizing firm size, which re-
duces industry output and subsequently aggregate income. That credit frictions re-
strain entrepreneurship is broadly acknowledged throughout the theoretical and em-
pirical literature; see e.g. Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989),
1Our analysis is also embedded in literature on dynamic general equilibrium models with idiosyn-
cratic risks and borrowing constraints which stress the importance of buffer–stock saving and entrepren-
eurial activity for the explanation of the empirically observed accumulation patterns; see e.g. Quadrini
(2000), Meh (2005), Bohác˘ek (2006, 2007), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a,b), Clemens and Heinemann
(2010).
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Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b), and Gentry and Hubbard (2004). Thirdly, industry–
specific financial constraints lead to an inefficient allocation of capital across sectors.
The share of capital employed in the unconstrained sector is too large compared to a
frictionless economy. Straightforwardly, with diminishing returns to capital, the equi-
librium real interest rate of a closed economy facing comparably tight constraints is
likely to be lower than the world rate of return (cf. Caballero et al., 2008). Going
from autarky to financial openness, the real interest rates rises to the global equi-
librium rate and the economy becomes a net–lender. Capital is reallocated towards
those foreign countries who face less tight constraints and originally higher domestic
rates of return.
Comparing steady states of the closed vis-à-vis the financially integrated (albeit
constrained) economy, we find that rising interest rates trigger wealth accumula-
tion. Household wealth serves as collateral for external funding of non–corporate
enterprises. Wealthier households are more likely to be members of the entrepren-
eurial class than poorer ones, which is consistent with recent empirical findings
(Quadrini, 1999; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a). The increase in the interest rate par-
tially relieves business owners from financing constraints and stimulates economic
activity, even though the fundamental market conditions remain unchanged. We
observe an accumulation–driven rise in the entrepreneurship rate. But only in the
heavily constrained economy the expansion in the mass of firms actually turns into
an increase in sectoral output, because shrinking firm sizes bring on a counter–acting
effect. The latter prevails in less constrained economies and—in combination with re-
duced capital inputs due to outbound capital flows—leads towards an overall decline
in GDP.
Our analysis extends the contribution of Mendoza et al. (2009), who explain
the ‘upstream’ pattern of international capital flows primarily with excess saving
due to the presence of borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic risk in the house-
hold sector in a standard incomplete markets economy. Other recent work in
this area includes Angeletos and Panousi (2011), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2014),
Buera and Shin (2009), and Sandri (2009). The authors agree that welfare conse-
quences of international integration in standard incomplete market models are large
when compared to representative agent economies. They, too, find ambiguous aggre-
gate welfare effects and large distributional effects of financial integration. However,
the standard incomplete markets approach suffers from the drawback that, given less
developed countries are characterized by tighter borrowing constraints and/or higher
risk, overaccumulation leads to higher per capita incomes. Mendoza et al. (2009)
circumvent this counterfactual outcome by assuming exogenously given productivity
differences. Our paper pursues a different approach. Similar to the contributions of
Angeletos and Panousi (2011) and Buera and Shin (2009), we take account of finan-
cial constraints in production, which is an empirically important issue.
We develop a model economy which is closely related to modern growth theory
and draw on previous work (Clemens, 2006, 2008; Clemens and Heinemann, 2006,
2010). We combine occupational choice under risk à la Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)
and Kanbur (1979) with the two–sector approach of Romer (1990), but without en-
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dogenous growth. The risk–averse agents choose between two occupations in each
period of time, either setting up a an enterprise in the intermediate goods industry or
being worker in the production of a final good. All households are subject to an idio-
syncratic income risk which cannot be pooled. Managerial ability and productivity as
a worker follow independent random processes. Entrepreneurial activity is rewarded
with a higher expected income. An entrepreneur employs capital from own and bor-
rowed resources and can be subject to financial constraints. Due to the two–sector
general equilibrium nature of our model, the optimal business size and the demand
for credit are endogenously determined. There is no aggregate risk.
The model is broadly consistent with macro data from industrialized countries.
Naturally, the model cannot draw a realistic picture of the economy over the entire
domain of financial constraints under consideration. For this reason, we define a
benchmark economy with an empirically plausible debt–equity ratio, and calibrate
the model to match the standard macroeconomic key variables.
Our paper does not address the role of intermediaries for the growth process
and the relationship between financial market integration and development; cf.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), King and Levine
(1993a,b), Boyd and Smith (1997), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006, 2007), Aoki et al.
(2009), Buera and Shin (2009). The general insight from this body of literature is
that capital account liberalization speeds up the process of convergence and promotes
growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the two–sector model.
We describe the closed–economy equilibrium associated with a stationary earnings
and wealth distribution. Since the formal structure of the model does not allow for
analytical solutions, we perform numerical simulations of a calibrated model in order
to examine the general equilibrium effects of financial market integration. Section 3
gives details on calibration and discusses the numerical results. Section 4 provides a
welfare analysis and raises politico–economic issues. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Two–Sectoral Model with Financial Market Imperfections
2.1 Production
We consider a small economy with two sectors engaged in the production of a ho-
mogenous final output good Y .2 Firms of the corporate sector are perfectly competi-
tive. They employ capital KF , labor L, and a variety of intermediate goods x(i), i∈ [0,λ]
to produce final output Y according to the neoclassical generalized CES–technology3
Y =
(
KγF L
1−γ)1−α Z λ
0
x(i)α d i , α,γ ∈ (0,1) . (1)
The intermediate goods are close but imperfect substitutes. Each variety i is identified
with a single producer in the intermediate goods industry. λ then represents the en-
2We draw from previous work (Clemens and Heinemann, 2010) for the general layout of the model.
Closely related contributions are Quadrini (2000); Angeletos and Panousi (2011).
3All macroeconomic variables are time–dependent. For notational convenience, we will drop the
explicit time–notation unless necessary. If needed, the ′ symbol denotes next period variables.
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trepreneurship rate of the economy and is endogenously determined in equilibrium,
once households have made a choice on their occupation. We assume that the capital
stock depreciates at the constant rate δ. The price of final output is normalized to
unity. p(i) is the price of intermediate good i.
In each period, the profit of the representative firm in the corporate sector, Π, is
given by
Π = Y −wL− (r +δ)KF −
Z λ
0
p(i)x(i) d i . (2)
The profit–maximizing factor demand for capital, labor and intermediate inputs are
determined in accordance with marginal productivity theory
KF = (1−α)γ
Y
r +δ , (3)
L = (1−α)(1− γ)Y
w
, (4)
x(i) = KγFL
1−γ
(
α
p(i)
) 1
1−α
, (5)
Equations (3) and (4) represent the final good sector demand for capital services and
labor in efficiency units respectively. r and w denote the equilibrium factor prices.
The producer of intermediate good x(i) faces the isoelastic demand function (5).
The non–corporate sector comprises a large number of monopolistic firms. Each firm
is owned by an entrepreneur and produces a single variety of the intermediate good,
using capital, k(i), as sole input according to the constant returns to scale technology
x(i) = θ(i)e k(i) . (6)
Firm owners differ with respect to their entrepreneurial talents, measured by the
idiosyncratic productivity shock θ(i)e, which we assume to be non–diversifiable and
uncorrelated across firms. We assume that firm–specific factor demand takes place
after the draw of nature has occurred, such that there is no under–employment of
capital. Maximization of profit
pi(k(i),θ(i)e) = p(i)x(i)− (r +δ)k(i) (7)
leads to the following decision expressed in terms of the optimal firm size k(i)∗:
k(i)∗ = L θ(i)
α
1−α
e
(
γw
(1− γ)(r +δ)
)γ ( α2
r +δ
) 1
1−α
. (8)
The optimal firm size declines with rising costs of capital and is larger for higher
realizations of individual productivity θ(i)e, implying that more productive business
owners have a larger demand for capital.
2.2 Capital market and financial constraints
We assume that firms of the final goods sector have unrestricted access to the capital
market. Contrary, business owners in the intermediate goods industry face finan-
cial constraints. The credit market is imperfect because lenders are unable to enforce
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loan–repayment due to limited commitment of borrowers (cf. Banerjee and Newman,
1993). Loan amounts are limited and individual wealth serves as collateral. In case
of default, the lender is able to seize a fraction of the borrowers gross capital income
(1 + r)a(i) and will lend only the amount consistent with the borrower’s incentive–
compatibility constraint, such that it is in the borrower’s interest to repay the loan.
There is not credit default in equilibrium.4 We also assume that international integra-
tion does not directly relax financing constraints for business owners because finan-
cial integration in our model neither helps to alleviate agency problems nor directly
facilitates small firms’ access to external funding.
Let k(i) = a(i)+b(i) be the firm size an entrepreneur is able to operate at from own
wealth a(i) and borrowed resources b(i). Depending on the level of individual entre-
preneurial wealth, the operating firm size k(i) falls short of the profit–maximizing
firm size k(i)∗, if access to credit is limited and financial constraints become binding.
Incentive–compatibility requires a self–enforcing contract. It is never optimal for the
borrower to default, if
pi(i)+(1+ r)a(i) > pi(i)+b(i)(1+ r)+(1−φ)(1+ r)a(i)
which boils down to
b(i) 6 φa(i) . (9)
The maximum possible loan is proportional to the business owner’s wealth a(i). The
parameter φ can be viewed as a credit multiplier. Credit constraints relax for rising
φ and effectively vanish for very large φ. The limiting cases reflect complete enforce-
ability (φ→ ∞) or no enforceability (φ = 0).
Utilizing the collateral constraint (9), enables us to write the operating firm size
of entrepreneur i with productivity θ(i)e and wealth a(i) as follows:
k (θ(i)e ,a(i)) = min [k(i)∗,(1+φ)a(i)] . (10)
Summing up, demand for capital in the closed economy is from firms of the fi-
nal good industry and from credit–constrained entrepreneurs. Regarding the capital
supply side, this comprises workers’ savings and entrepreneurial wealth from those
business owners, whose personal assets exceed their respective optimal capital input.
We assume that there is no difference between borrowing and lending rates, mean-
ing that all capital is supplied to the (domestic or international) capital market at the
equilibrium interest rate r.
Because our focus lies on the effects of financial market integration, we assume
labor to be immobile and output goods to be non–tradeable. Hence, all trade between
internationally integrated economies is financial.
2.3 Households and occupational choice
We assume a continuum [0,1] of infinitely–lived risk–averse households. All house-
holds are endowed with a unit of raw labor, which they either supply inelastically to
4We do not explicitly model financial intermediaries.
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the labor market or use for running and managing a business. Households differ with
respect to the realization of idiosyncratic shocks to labor efficiency or entrepreneurial
productivity respectively. In order to have wage incomes less risky than profits, we
assume that worker productivities are more evenly distributed than entrepreneurial
skills. There is no market for pooling individual income risks. Every period, each
household decides anew on his occupation. Regarding the timing of events, we as-
sume that occupational choice takes place before the resolution of uncertainty in the
respective period. Occupational choice is irreversible in the same period. There is no
aggregate risk.
We assume that labor efficiency θw evolves according to a serially correlated first–
order stochastic process with h = 1, . . . ,H states, θw,h > 0. Likewise, entrepreneurial
productivity θe evolves according to a serially correlated first–order stochastic process
with h = 1, . . . ,H different states θe,1, . . . ,θe,H , θe,h > 0. Realizations from the two
stochastic processes are mutually independent to capture the idea that a presently
high productivity in the one occupation not necessarily indicates an equally high
productivity in the other. The associated probabilities are summarized in a H ×H
transition matrices Pj, j′ describing the transition from productivity state θ j,h to state
θ j′,h′ for h,h′ = 1, . . . ,H, j, j′ = e,w.
Each household i has preferences over consumption and maximizes discounted
expected lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt U [ct(i)].
E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information available at date 0 and
β ∈ (0,1) denotes the discount factor. Individuals are identical with respect to their
preferences regarding momentary consumption c(i) which are described by constant
relative risk aversion measured by the parameter ρ
U [c(i)] =
c(i)1−ρ
1−ρ for ρ > 0,ρ 6= 1,
and lnct(i) for ρ = 1.
Income and wealth heterogeneity in our model stem from uninsurable shocks and
credit market imperfections. We assume that households are subject to borrowing
constraints, restricting their means to smooth their consumption flow. Typical for
standard incomplete market models, this gives rise to overaccumulation, because
individuals undertake buffer–stock saving (Carroll, 1997) in their desire to protect
themselves against fluctuations in consumption.5 We assume that individual asset
holdings are bounded from below and set the lowest possible wealth level to a = 0.
In what follows V w(a(i),θ(i)w) denotes the maximized value function of a house-
hold currently a worker with wealth a and a given productivity level θw. If the agent
5This implies the counterfactual result that for two countries, which differ only with respect to
the tightness of borrowing constraints, the more constrained economy accumulates more capital and
therefore has a higher GDP per capita than the less constrained one. Mendoza et al. (2009) circumvent
this result by assuming exogenously given differences in aggregate productivity. Our model generates
results which are consistent with the empirical evidence that more constrained economies typically are
poorer than the less constrained ones, due to the presence of financial constraints in production, the
endogenously determined entrepreneurship rate, and endogenous adjustments in firm sizes.
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remains a worker, his future productivity is determined according to the transition
matrix Pw,w. If he decides to change occupations, he draws from the time–invariant
distribution of entrepreneurial skills. The next period productivity θ′e is determined
by the transition matrix Pw,e.
The maximized value function for an individual currently a worker is given by
V w (a(i),θ(i)w) = max
c(i)>0,a(i)′>a,q(i)′∈{0,1}
{
U [c(i)]
+β(1−q(i)′)Ew,w [V w (a(i)′,θ(i)′w)]+βq(i)′Ew,e [V e (a(i)′,θ(i)′e)]
}
s.t. a(i)′ = (1+ r)a(i)+θ(i)w w− c(i) .
(11)
q is a boolean variable, taking the value 0 if the agent decides to stay in the present
occupation, and taking the value 1, if he decides to leave. The optimal decision asso-
ciated with problem (11) is described by the the policy function a(i)′w = Aw (a(i), θ(i)w)
and a rule on the future professional state q(i)′w = Qw (a(i), θ(i)w).
For business owners let accordingly V e(a(i),θ(i)e) denote the maximized value
function of an entrepreneur with wealth a in productivity state θe. His future produc-
tivities are determined by either Pe,e or Pe,w, depending on his occupational choice.
The intertemporal problem of an entrepreneur can be written as
V e(a(i),θ(i)e) = max
c(i)>0,a(i)′>a,q(i)′{0,1}
{
U [c(i)]
+β(1−q(i)′)Ee,e [V e (a(i)′,θ(i)′e)]+βq(i)′Ee,w [V w (a(i)′,θ(i)′w)]
}
s.t. a(i)′ = (1+ r)a(i)+ p(x(i))x(θ(i)e,k(i))− (r +δ)k(i)− c(i)
k(i) = min [k(i)∗,(1+φ)a(i)]
(12)
The optimal decision is described the policy function a(i)′e = Ae(a(i), θ(i)e) and the
decision rule q(i)′e = Qe(a(i), θ(i)e).
2.4 Stationary recursive equilibrium in the closed economy
Definition 1 A stationary recursive competitive general equilibrium is defined by equi-
librium factor prices w,r, policy functions Aw, Ae, decision rules Qw, Qe with associated
value functions Vw, Ve such that the following conditions hold:
(i) The policy functions Aw and Ae and decision rules Qe and Qe solve the worker’s or
entrepreneur’s optimization problem respectively.
(ii) Aggregate demand for consumption, labor, capital and intermediate goods is the
aggregation of individual demands. Factor and commodity markets clear at con-
stant equilibrium prices w, r, p.
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Table 1: Calibration Values
Calibrated parameter Target Source
Technology Interest rate r 2–4% (Obstfeld, 1994;
King and Rebelo, 1999)α γ δ
0.33 0.06 0.1 Factor income shares
labor 0.63 (King and Rebelo,
1999, PSID)Preferences profit 0.22
ρ β capital 0.15
2.0 0.91
Gini index of wealth 0.6–0.7
Shocks
σ2ε,w ρw σ2ε,e ρe Income persistence ρ j = 0.9 (Guvenen, 2009;
Storesletten et al., 2004)0.0171 0.9 0.855 0.9 Log wage income risk 0.3
Financial frictions Entrepreneurship rate 15–25% (GEM, 2005)
φ Exit / entry rates 20–35% (Quadrini, 2000; Vale,
2006; Aghion et al., 2007)0,1,1032(∞)
(iii) The stationary distribution Γ(a,θe,θw;w,r, p,φ) of agents over individual wealth
holdings, occupations and associated productivities is the fixed point of the law
of motion which is consistent with the individual decision rules and equilibrium
prices. The distribution λ,1−λ of agents over occupations is time–invariant.
We obtain aggregate labor supply by summing up individual labor supply in efficiency
units over the population share of 1−λ workers. Capital supply equals mean wealth
holdings and meets capital demand from the two sectors of production. The equi-
librium entrepreneurship rate λ and the stationary distribution of entrepreneurial
productivities determine the aggregate supply of intermediate goods
3 Numerical Analysis
3.1 Calibration
In order to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of financial integration, we calibrate
a benchmark model to match standard macro data for the U.S. or the average EU15.
We set the measure of relative risk aversion ρ and the time discount factor β in ac-
cordance with the literature (cf. Obstfeld, 1994; King and Rebelo, 1999). The para-
metric specifications are summarized in Table 1. The productivity parameters α and
γ are chosen to generate empirically plausible income shares with close to two thirds
of income accruing to labor. PSID data report a income share for entrepreneurs of
around 22%, which we match in an economy without financial constraints. The rate
of capital depreciation is set to 10%.
Labor efficiency θw and entrepreneurial productivity θe follow a lognormal AR(1)
process with normalized mean E[θ j] = 1, j = e,w, which in continuous space is given
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by:
lnθ′j =−1/(1+ρ j)
σ2j
2
+ρ j lnθ j + ε , ε∼ N (0,σ2ε, j) . (13)
The AR(1) process is approximated in discrete state–space by a five–state Markov
chain using the method proposed by Rouwenhorst (1995). The transition matrices for
individuals who decide to change their occupations are derived from the stationary
distributions of the Markov processes, such that, e.g., the probability for a worker
to draw the highest state of entrepreneurial productivity is given by the stationary
(unconditional) probability of this state.
We follow the literature in assuming a high persistence of income shocks and set
ρ j = 0.9. σ2ε,w is chosen to generate a standard deviation of wage incomes close to 0.3.
This specification matches empirical evidence reported by Storesletten et al. (2001)
and Guvenen (2009). Given the relatively scarce evidence on idiosyncratic profit
risk, we choose a higher variance in order to reproduce the larger risk associated
with entrepreneurial activity and to generate empirically plausible entrepreneurship
rates and Gini coefficients of wealth. In our simulated baseline model, the standard
deviation of log profits is about three to four times the standard deviation of log
wage incomes. Regarding the definition of entrepreneurship, we follow the notion
that self–employment encompasses (OECD, 2000, Ch. 5, p. 191):
“. . . those jobs, where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the prof-
its derived from the goods and services produced. The incumbents make the
operational decisions affecting the enterprise, or delegate such decisions while
retaining responsibility for the welfare of the enterprise.”
Our model generates entrepreneurship rates around 20–25%, which is at the upper
range of values for OECD countries (including owner–managers), matching countries
like New Zealand (20.8%), Italy (24.8%), or Spain (18.3%), but also is empirically
plausible for emerging economies; see also the annual Global Entrepreneurship Mon-
itor (GEM 2005, Minniti et al.).
We consider three different values for the credit multiplier φ. To mimic unlimited
access to external financing (φ→∞) we find it sufficient in our simulations to choose
φ = 1032 as largest value, where effectively no entrepreneur is credit–constrained.
The other two values are φ = 0 (no external financing) and φ = 1, i.e., the maximum
operating capital is restricted to twice the business owner’s individual asset holdings
(cf. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004).
The model is computed using the algorithm described in Clemens and Heinemann
(2010).
3.2 The role of entrepreneurial risk and financial frictions
In this section, we investigate how either a change in idiosyncratic entrepreneurial
risk or in the credit multiplier affects the macroeconomic equilibrium of the closed
economy. Alternatively, the results can be interpreted as comparing two economies
which differ only with respect to the size of business risk or the tightness of credit fric-
tions. Our numerical results generate the empirically relevant and plausible outcome
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Table 2: Equilibrium Effects of Lower Entrepreneurial Risk
high risk low risk ∆
(σ2ε,e = 50σ2ε,w) (σ2ε,e = 10σ2ε,w)
GDP 0.213 0.218 +2.35 %
entrepreneurship rate 0.239 0.285 +4.6 p.p.
∅ firm size 0.686 0.506 −26.23 %
X =
R
λ x(i)α d i 0.255 0.269 +5.49 %
KI 0.164 0.144 −12.20 %
KF 0.061 0.053 −13.11 %
L 0.896 0.863 −3.68 %
real interest rate 0.041 0.065 +2.4. p.p.
wage rate 0.150 0.159 +6.00 %
∅ wage income 0.176 0.191 +8.52 %
∅ profit 0.197 0.169 −14.21 %
∅ wealth 0.224 0.196 −12.5 %
∅ worker wealth 0.137 0.188 +37.22 %
∅ business wealth 0.503 0.219 −56.46 %
Gini 0.601 0.494
σ(logwages) 0.240 0.248
σ(logprofits) 0.909 0.434
that both factors—either an increase in risk or in the tightness of constraints—reduce
aggregate output.
Table 2 presents the numerical results for the baseline model and a scenario char-
acterized by lower risk for an economy, where firms in the intermediate goods in-
dustry are free from financial constraints (φ → ∞). The parameter values are chosen
such that the relative riskiness in terms of the standard deviation of log profits over
log wage incomes in the low–risk scenario is about half of the baseline value. We
skip the issue of firm financing for the moment because this allows us to highlight
the additional economic channel which modeling a two–sectoral production structure
brings to the standard incomplete markets model.
The household sector has significantly larger asset holdings in the high risk situ-
ation compared to the low risk one. This reflects the precautionary motive in saving
which also is reinforced by the presence of borrowing constraints. In the standard
incomplete markets economy, this ‘overaccumulation’ typically implies a larger econ-
omywide capital stock, an associated lower equilibrium real interest rate and a higher
GDP per capita. Although our model replicates the first two effects, GDP in the high
risk scenario is lower. The result is more in accordance with economic intuition,
suggesting that larger risk harms economic performance.
The GDP effect can be traced back to adjustments in occupational choice leading
to firm size and output responses in the intermediate goods industry. The overall
contribution of intermediate goods, X =
R λ
0 x(i)α d i, to output acts as a productivity
variable for capital and labor inputs. It crucially depends on the equilibrium en-
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Table 3: Equilibrium Effects of varying the Tightness of Financial Constraints
φ ∞ 1 0 ∆(φ : ∞→ 0)
GDP 0.213 0.198 0.169 −20.66 %
entrepreneurship rate 0.239 0.246 0.241 −2.0 p.p
X =
R
λ x(i)α d i 0.255 0.238 0.202 −20.78 %
∅ firm size 0.686 0.566 0.421 −38.63 %
KI 0.164 0.139 0.102 −37.80 %
KF 0.061 0.064 0.069 +13.11 %
L 0.896 0.889 0.895 −1.11 %
real interest rate 0.041 0.024 −0.002 −4.3 p.p.
wage rate 0.150 0.140 0.119 −20.67 %
∅ wage income 0.176 0.167 0.140 −20.45 %
∅ profit 0.197 0.195 0.190 −3.55 %
∅ wealth 0.224 0.204 0.171 −23.66 %
∅ worker wealth 0.137 0.087 0.056 −59.12 %
∅ business wealth 0.503 0.117 0.114 −77.34 %
Gini 0.601 0.596 0.671
σ(logwages) 0.240 0.242 0.244
σ(logprofits) 0.909 0.897 0.902
trepreneurship rate and firm sizes in the industry. A decline in business risk has a
markedly positive effect on the first. The relative riskiness of occupations in the low
risk situation drops significantly and explains the shift in occupations. The associated
decline in labor supply in the final goods industry implies a higher market clearing
wage rate and also a comparable increase in average wage incomes and average
wealth of workers.
The increase in the mass of business owners, however, is accompanied by a more
than proportional decline in the average firm size which is due to higher interest
rates following the reduction in aggregate wealth and capital supply, and the fact
that the precautionary motive becomes less pressing. The increase in total output
from the intermediate sector is responsible for net GDP growth, because it more than
compensates for the relatively moderate decline in labor employment and the more
pronounced reduction in capital inputs.6
We now give a brief review of how a change in the tightness of financial con-
straints effects the macroeconomic equilibrium. For a more detailed analysis, see
Clemens and Heinemann (2010). We consider three different degrees of tightness,
no credit, φ = 0, unlimited access, φ → ∞, and a credit multiplier of φ = 1. Table 3
summarizes the results. Although the value of φ is fixed exogenously, the credit de-
mand as well as the magnitude of rationing is determined endogenously and depends
on firm–specific factors, such as optimal business size (8), individual wealth, factor
prices and the ability shocks.
6The contribution of factors to aggregate output can be decomposed by using the productivity
weights γ(1−α) for capital and (1− γ)(1−α) for efficient labor.
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Financial frictions in the entrepreneurial sector dampen economic performance
substantially, the aggregate output loss amounting to over 20%, when comparing
the frictionless vis–s`a–vis the no–credit economy. This dampening effect transmits
into all sectors of the economy, lowering the wage rate, average wage and profit
incomes, and also reducing wealth holdings. The decline in the real interest rate is
the consequence of capital now being shifted into the production of the final good,
instead of being used in the intermediate goods industry. Capital inputs in the latter
slump by roughly 40% if access to external financing is no longer available.
The entrepreneurship rate similar to the Gini coefficient of wealth shows a non–
monotonic response to tighter financial constraints. This can be explained by the
equivalently non–monotonic change in the standard deviation of log profits, the lower
value at φ = 1 being associated with higher incentives for business ownership. The
riskiness of profits relative to wage incomes decreases throughout, which explains
why the entrepreneurship rate stays above its level of the frictionless economy even
when the financial market is completely closed.
3.3 Macroeconomic effects of international financial integration
We now turn to the macroeconomic effects of financial integration. As outlined be-
fore, we presume a small open economy where both output goods are non–tradeable
and there is no labor migration. Hence, the macroeconomic effects of international
integration are entirely driven by the initial wedge between the autarky and the world
equilibrium interest rate and the associated inbound (or outbound) capital flows. We
assume as a starting point for our analysis that the autarky equilibrium is character-
ized by a lower than the world interest rate, rA < rW , the subscripts denoting ‘autarky’
and ‘world’ respectively.
In the course of financial integration, the real interest rate immediately jumps
to its world equilibrium value, triggering adjustments in capital demand from the
final goods industry, in the allocation of capital between sector, in savings, and sub-
sequently in occupational choice. We compare the steady state under autarky with
the equilibrium allocation of the integrated economy for the three underlying values
of credit frictions.
Case I: Frictionless Entrepreneurial Sector (φ→ ∞)
Figure 2 summarizes the macroeconomic effects of international financial integra-
tion for the case of unlimited access to external financing in the intermediate goods
industry. Here, our model generates results similar to those already described by
Mendoza et al. (2009). The results for the small open economy are expressed in
terms of the initial wedge between the real interest rate under autarky relative to the
equilibrium world rate.
A country initially characterized by a lower domestic real interest rate will export
capital and experiences a decrease in GDP. The returning interest payments raise
GNP above the autarky level; see panels (a) and (b) of figure 2. We observe an
increase in average wealth accumulation for rising interest rates which is typical for
14
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Effects of International Financial Integration, Case I
standard incomplete market economies, but more than the additionally accumulated
capital is invested abroad, which becomes obvious from the decline in capital inputs
in both domestic sectors of production. Accordingly, output in the intermediate goods
industry declines and contributes to the decline in aggregate output.; see panels 2(c)
and 2(d).
The optimal firm size k(i)∗ declines for rising interest rates, which follows directly
from (8).7 With unlimited access to external financing, each entrepreneur will be
7The elasticity of a change in the cost factor r + δ is easily derived from (8) and given by ∂k∗/k∗×
∂(r +δ)/(r +δ) =−2.
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Table 4: Macroeconomic Effects of Integration in the Constrained Economy
φ = 0 φ = 1
autarky integrated ∆ autarky integrated ∆
GNP 0.169 0.174 +2.96 % 0.198 0.202 +2.02 %
GDP 0.169 0.171 +1.18 % 0.198 0.196 −1.01 %
entrepreneurship rate 0.241 0.243 +0.2 p.p. 0.246 0.248 +0.2 p.p
∅ firm size 0.421 0.418 −0.71 % 0.567 0.537 −5.29 %
X =
R
λ x(i)α di 0.202 0.205 +1.49 % 0.238 0.237 −0.42 %
KF 0.069 0.062 −10.14 % 0.064 0.059 −7.81 %
KI 0.102 0.102 0.00 % 0.140 0.133 −5.0 %
NFA/GDP 0 0.152 0 0.204
L 0.895 0.895 0.00 % 0.889 0.888 −0.11 %
wage rate 0.119 0.120 +8.40 % 0.140 0.139 −0.71 %
∅ wage income 0.148 0.152 +2.70 % 0.180 0.183 +1.66 %
∅ profit 0.237 0.240 +1.27 % 0.254 0.258 +1.57 %
∅ wealth 0.171 0.190 +11.11 % 0.204 0.232 +13.73 %
∅ worker wealth 0.056 0.069 +23.21 % 0.086 0.104 +20.93 %
∅ business wealth 0.114 0.120 +5.26 % 0.117 0.127 +8.55 %
Gini 0.540 0.533 0.596 0.584
able to operate his business at a profit–maximizing scale, such that average firm sizes
decline accordingly in the new steady state. Higher average wealth levels and a larger
fraction of individual income derived out of safe returns domestic and abroad, attract
more households into business ownership, giving an extra tinge to competition and
consequently reducing business sizes.
Most effects reverse for a country initially characterized by a higher autarky cap-
ital return, that is rA > rW . All macroeconomic variables behave monotonously to a
change in the steady state real interest rate, except for GNP. The country becomes a
net–importer of capital and the rising international debt payments from a negative
NFA interact with rising GDP to give GNP a U–shape contour.
Case II: Financial Frictions in the Entrepreneurial Sector (φ ∈ {0,1})
We proceed with the case of a small economy, where business owners are subject
to financial constraints. Whereas our findings for the frictionless economy by and
large replicate the results already described in Mendoza et al. (2009) on a qualitative
level, the additional presence of financial frictions in the business sector introduces
a new economic channel which under certain conditions is capable of reversing the
macroeconomic effects. Figure 3 and Table 4 display the results from our numerical
simulations.
Generally, financial frictions cause an excess employment of physical capital in the
production of the final good. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate under autarky is
even lower than in the standard incomplete markets economy, where only households
are subject to borrowing constraints. The demand for capital from the intermediate
16
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic Effects of International Financial Integration, Case II
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goods industry potentially would be large, but cannot be satisfied due to limited or no
access to credit. Business owners of this industry either produce at suboptimally small
firm sizes,8 or they have to be sufficiently wealthy to operate at the profit–maximizing
level k(i)∗.
Allowing for international capital movements, a new steady state of this economy
again is characterized by a jump of the domestic to the higher world interest rate,
which triggers capital exports. Figure 3 illustrates the response of the macroeconomic
variables to financial integration in terms of the initial wedge between the domestic
real interest rate and the world return, whereas Table 4 gives the numerical results
for a one percentage point increase in the interest rate starting from the autarky
situation.
For φ = 1, we find no qualitative differences in results compared to the case of the
frictionless economy. The equilibrium NFA/GDP ratio is positive and increasing in the
initial spread rW − rA. GDP declines, whereas GNP increases. The entrepreneurship
rate increases, while average business sizes and overall output in the intermediate
sector fall. We observe a larger number of (albeit) smaller firms, who on average
make less profit in the integrated economy.9 The adjustments in aggregate labor
input are close to nil and the decline in the equilibrium wage rate is a consequence
from downscaling the inputs of the two other factors of production KF and X .
Interestingly, the results for GDP, wages and output of the intermediate sector
reverse, if we consider the case of a zero credit multiplier, φ = 0. As, by assump-
tion, access to external financing is not easing up for business owners, average firm
sizes do only respond very little to financial integration; see figure 3(f). Neverthe-
less, adjustments in asset holdings and occupational choice are important. Financial
constraints affect especially households with little wealth. An increase in accumu-
lation due to a higher world interest rate relaxes business owners’ dependency on
external financing. More agents move into entrepreneurship as households expand
their wealth holdings; see figures 3(c) and 3(e). Table 4 shows that the increase in
accumulation goes along with a reduction in wealth inequality.
Notably, whereas general equilibrium adjustments in firm sizes, business capital,
and occupational choice lead to a decline in sectoral output X for the case of φ = 1,
they sum up to an increase in X for the case of φ = 0. This also explains the associated
increase in GDP and wage incomes. A completely constrained economy not only
experiences an increase in GNP due to backflows of returns to foreign assets, but
also reallocates factor inputs such that domestic output grows in comparison to the
autarky state. International capital market liberalization primarily helps to overcome
domestic financial constraints in an indirect way.
3.4 Transitory Dynamics
We now briefly discuss the transitional dynamics. The panels of Figure 4 show the
adjustments paths of the macroeconomic variables towards the new steady state in
8This problem primarily hits the most talented with the highest realizations of θ(i)e.
9The country being a net–lender, overall average income for both occupational groups increases.
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Figure 4: Transitory Dynamics (percentage deviation relative to autarky)
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terms of a percentage deviation from the old steady state over a time span of 140
periods, where transition is sufficiently completed. Our model essentially is a neo-
classical one and displays the typical mechanics of adjustment. We focus on the case
of financial constraints in the business sector, presenting only results for a debt–equity
ratio of one and the complete absence of external financing.
The economy heavily employs capital in the production of the final good in the
closed economy. With the world interest rate being larger than the domestic one un-
der autarky, the necessary adjustment in marginal productivity requires a reduction in
capital inputs, and excess supply in physical capital is shifted abroad. Consequently,
output in both sectors of production as well as the average firm size in the interme-
diate goods industry show an immediate downward jump as the net foreign asset
position jumps upward for outbound capital flows. The economy continues to ex-
port capital during the early phase of transition, which explains the ongoing drop in
output.
The rise in the real interest rate triggers accumulation. The household sector holds
an increasing amount of wealth (not displayed here).10 Ultimately, the accumulation
effect prevails and explains the turning points in figures 4(a), 4(c), and 4(d). With the
rising entrepreneurship rate, total output in the intermediate sector starts to expand
in the medium run. Intermediate goods substitute for lower capital inputs in the
final output sector. Subsequently, GDP and GNP grow towards their new steady state
levels.
As can be seen in Figure 4 the response of sectoral output and occupational choice
to financial integration is more pronounced for the case of no credit–availability,
φ = 0, whereas capital exports relative to GDP and the firm size effect are smaller in
magnitude. For the net foreign asset position and average firm size we even observe
an overshooting throughout transition. A comparison between the left hand and right
hand panels in Figures 4(a) and 4(c) also demonstrates quite nicely that the overall
GDP gain for the case of φ = 0 can be traced back to the total output expansion in the
intermediate goods industry, where the new steady state lies above the autarky level
in this case and below for φ = 1.
4 Welfare Analysis
We employ a utilitarian welfare measure, aggregating individual welfare gains (or
losses) over all agents in the economy. The individual welfare effect is measured by a
compensating variation, i. e., the consumption amount necessary to compensate the
household for financial integration, leaving her indifferent between autarky and the
integrated economy.
Our welfare measure accounts for the transitory adjustments between the two
steady states. We calculate the change in consumption for an individual with wealth
a(i), occupation j and associated productivity θ(i) j, necessary to equate the value
10Average wealth holdings grow monotonously during transition for all levels of constraints under
consideration.
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functions V A(a(i),θ(i) j),V I(a(i),θ(i) j), where the superscripts denote autarky and in-
tegration.
∆cA(i) =
[
V A(a(i),θ(i) j)
V I(a(i),θ(i) j)
−1
]
cA(i) (14)
The amount ∆ leaves the consumer indifferent between the two allocations under
comparison. Taking expectations with respect to the stationary probability measure
Γ(a,θe,θw;w,r, p,φ) gives the aggregate welfare measure
∆cA
cA
=
E∆cA(i)
cA
. (15)
A positive value reflects a welfare gain associated with international financial inte-
gration.
Figure 5 displays the results of our numerical simulations. The left–hand panels
show the welfare gains or losses arising for alternative world interest rates, for the
society as a whole and decomposed with respect to the two classes of occupations.
The respective equilibrium rate under autarky is represented by the vertical dashed
line, where all lines intersect at zero level. The right hand panels show the population
fractions supporting financial integration, again in total and decomposed with respect
to occupational classes. These fractions represent the agents who actually benefit
from international integration (or are at least indifferent towards it). Our discussion
focuses on autarky situations, where the domestic equilibrium return is lower than
the world rate.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show that the similarity of results from the analysis of
the macroeconomic effects for the economy without financial frictions and the case
of φ = 1 carries over to the welfare analysis. In an economy, where the domestic
return is lower than the world rate, the society as a whole suffers a welfare loss from
financial integration and both classes loose, if the initial interest rate spread is not
too large.
For larger initial deviations between the autarky domestic rate and the world
rate, the welfare loss turns into a welfare gain, see the left–hand panel of 5(b) for
world rates close to five percent. To this extent, our model replicates results already
known for the standard incomplete markets model, i.e. that welfare effects are non–
monotonic in policy measures; for corresponding results see Antunes and Cavalcanti
(2014), or Domeij and Heathcote (2004) for the welfare effects of taxation.11 It fol-
lows from the unequal distribution of welfare gains and losses, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Interestingly, the welfare effect reverses for the case of complete financial frictions
in the entrepreneurial sector. Here, the society benefits from international integra-
tion. If we compare the magnitude of welfare effects in the three cases, the loss from
financial integration is most pronounced in the frictionless economy, less pronounced
but still a loss for φ = 1 and a gain for φ = 0. Entrepreneurs suffer least, workers most
11The U–shape in welfare can already be observed for the no–risk Ramsey model with endowment
heterogeneity.
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Figure 5: Welfare Effects of Financial Integration, total (red), worker (green),
entrepreneurs (blue)
in the first two cases, whereas both occupational groups benefit in the latter, workers
gaining even more than business owners.
The welfare results are reflected in the observed voting behavior. In the frictionless
economy, political support for financial integration is below ten percent over the
society as a whole, at maximum 20 percent for entrepreneurs and nil for workers,
only rising above the zero level for very large initial interest rate spreads. Political
support for financial integration is only slightly bigger for the case of φ = 1, ranging
from 10–35%. Again, integration receives larger support from the entrepreneurial
class. Generally, support is slightly increasing for larger initial differentials between
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Figure 6: Decomposing Welfare Effects of Financial Integration, total (red),
worker (green), entrepreneurs (blue)
the autarky interest rate and the world rate. However, a strong majority of households
would rather prefer autarky to integration in economies with less tight or no financial
frictions, whereas integration is supported unanimously by all groups in the case of
complete frictions.
For a deeper understanding of the welfare consequences, we now decompose indi-
vidual welfare gains and losses with respect to percentiles in the wealth distribution.
Relatively wealthier agents are expected to gain most from international integration.
They receive a comparably large fraction in total income from riskless interest pay-
ments on capital and now benefit from higher returns to foreign assets.
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Figure 6 displays the numerical results. The left–hand panels depict the distri-
bution of welfare gains or losses over the wealth distribution for the society as a
whole. The right–hand panels decompose the results with respect to both occupa-
tional classes. Figure 6(a) shows that only the topmost five percent of households in
the wealth distribution actually gain from international integration in the frictionless
economy, even though higher interest rates lead to an increase in aggregate accumu-
lation and GNP. The top group mainly consists of business owners, with only a small
fraction of consistently highly productive and therefore rich workers. A huge major-
ity of the population looses from international integration and the associated decline
in aggregate and sectoral production, because they have not accumulated sufficient
wealth to compensate for the income loss with interest payments from foreign assets.
Even for the relatively richer entrepreneurs, only the top quintile benefits from inte-
gration. This explains the overall relatively low level of political support for capital
market liberalization.
We obtain a similar picture for the case of φ = 1, although effects are mitigated
here due to the smaller decline in aggregate GDP. Roughly the top ten percent of
workers and the top quintile of entrepreneurs benefit from integration. The majority
of the populations suffers welfare losses. The decomposed welfare gains and losses
also explain the result from Figure 6(b) that—even though the aggregate welfare
effect is positive for large initial differentials between the domestic and the world
rate—political support remains well below one third of the population. The welfare
gains for the top five percent richest households (amounting at max to more than
a ten percent increase in consumption) outweigh the cumulated welfare losses of
the remaining 95% of the population. All households could potentially benefit from
international integration, if the society were able to implement and conduct a scheme
of compensating payments.
Figure 6(c) shows that in the case of a completely constrained economy (φ = 0)
households over the entire wealth distribution benefit from capital market liberaliza-
tion, explaining the unanimous support for international integration. Workers benefit
more than business owners especially in the lower percentiles of the wealth distribu-
tion. This can be explained with the substantial increase in the wage rate (8.4%, see
Table 4) and associated wage incomes, whereas average firm sizes and profits decline.
Still, the picture remains one of a very unequal distribution of welfare changes, the
very rich by far being the ones who benefit most from liberalization.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the consequences of international financial integration in a
two–sector heterogeneous–agent dynamic general equilibrium model of occupational
choice with financial constraints and idiosyncratic risks. We discuss the macroeco-
nomic and distributional effects of financial market integration for small economies
which differ only with respect to the tightness of constraints on the domestic credit
market. Workers and firm owners are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Entrepren-
eurship in the intermediate goods industry is the riskier occupation. In addition to
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general borrowing limits which affect the entire household sector, our model features
financing constraints in the non–corporate sector. The stationary wealth distribution
generated in the model is consistent with empirical findings.
As a general result, we find that tighter financial constraints or higher entrepren-
eurial risk on the domestic level cause substantial losses in aggregate output and
lower the equilibrium capital return of the closed economy. The latter effect can
mainly be attributed to the inefficient allocation of capital across sectors.
In our model, countries which are characterized by tighter domestic constraints
will ultimately export capital. This stands in contrast to the widely acknowl-
edged view in the literature that capital account liberalization relaxes financial
constraints and causes capital inflows, but can be reconciled with empirical evi-
dence for some developing countries. To this extent our model contributes to the
line of research by Gertler and Rogoff (1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), Matsuyama
(2004, 2005), or more recently Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza et al. (2009), and
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2014).
Our analysis focuses on economies, where the domestic equilibrium return under
autarky is lower than the world return under liberalized capital markets. The general
equilibrium nature of our model, where optimal firm sizes and the demand for credit
are determined endogenously, gives rise to interesting implications regarding the
macroeconomic effects of capital market liberalization. The response of GDP strongly
depends on the tightness of financial frictions, being negative for either no or more
lax constraints and positive if access to external financing is not available. Contrary,
GNP always rises due to the inflow of returns to foreign investments.
The ambiguous sign in the response of aggregate output can be traced back to
two important adjustments in the intermediate sector. Firstly, international integra-
tion affects occupational choice, the number of entrepreneurs being larger in the open
economy. Countries with tighter frictions benefit from a positive wealth effect of inte-
gration. A higher world return to capital reinforces accumulation, thereby indirectly
weakening the negative impact financial constraints have as a barrier to entrepren-
eurship. Secondly, average firm sizes decline. Depending on the tightness of financial
constraints, total industry output either grows or shrinks in the course of liberaliza-
tion, translating into either a productivity increase or decline in the production of
final output.
The ambiguity of results carries over to the welfare analysis. Countries with
severe credit market frictions may actually benefit from integration, whereas less–
constrained economies experience welfare losses. This result is due to the fact that
welfare gains and losses generally are very unequally distributed in the underlying
heterogeneous–agent economy. The uppermost percentiles always gain from integra-
tion, irrespective of the tightness of constraints, because they benefit most from the
corresponding increase in the interest rate. All agents gain in the economy with the
most tight constraints, because of an increase in both factor prices, in GDP, in wealth
and associated safe returns, which lower total income risk.
There are many important issues this paper does not address. In its present form
there is no trade in output goods, and all trade is financial. Taking account of in-
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ternational trade will be the next step of our research. It is a worthwhile extension
to consider a multi–country model, where the world interest rate is determined en-
dogenously in equilibrium. This allows us discuss the magnitude of macroeconomic
effects from financial integration in more detail. Last, the paper explicitly assumes
that capital market liberalization does not affect the tightness of domestic constraints,
an assumption which could also be relaxed in future research.
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